Illinois Supreme Court Civil Issues Pending: Contract Law

[UPDATED THROUGH May 14, 2012]

Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. The City of Naperville

Supreme Court Number: 113148

Appellate Court: Second District

Appellate Court Case Number: 2-10-0695

Issue Presented: In an action arising from plaintiff's contract to perform consulting services for defendant city, should plaintiff's claimed for work performed under the contract, additional work performed, quantum meruit, accounts stated, and violation of the Local Government Prompt Payment Act have been dismissed?

Appellate Court Opinion Summary: The parties entered into a contract for consulting services in connection with the development of a stormwater asset management system and geographic information system. Plaintiff informed defendant that the "feature count" -- a basic rule for calculating costs -- would be reached prior to the completion of the contract, and that a change order would be needed. When defendant refused to issue a change order, plaintiff ceased work. Plaintiff alleged that based on defendant's assurances that necessary budget adjustments would be made, it returned to work. In Count I of its complaint, plaintiff sought to recover both for work performed under the contract and for additional work required by the city. Although the extra work had not been authorized in writing or approved by the City council, plaintiff alleged that representations and conduct of City agents had given rise to an equitable estoppel preventing the defendant from denying payment. Count II related to additional work in the pilot area; count III was a claim for quantum meruit for work performed. Count IV was for accounts stated. Count V brought the same allegations as Count IV, restated under the Local Government Prompt Payment Act. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff had not obtained written authorization for additional work, the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply, the contract governed the work between the parties, making quantum meruit inapplicable, and the Local Government Prompt Payment Act was inapplicable since no money was owed. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff re-pled, focusing on the contract work, but the trial court dismissed again, holding that the work performed had not been adequately described. The Appellate Court reversed on the contract claim, holding that the defendant's nonacceptance of pilot area data was not a prerequisite to other work on the contract. With respect to non-contractual work, the Appellate Court also reversed, holding that City agents' alleged assurances that plaintiff would be compensated for such additional work created a triable issue of estoppel. Distinguishing Nielsen-Massey Vanillas v. City of Waukegan, 276 Ill.App.3d 148 (1995) and D. C. Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Batavia Park Dist., 143 Ill.App.3d 60 (1986), the Court declined to hold that where a contract was not, as a whole, ultra vires, an act must be that of the municipality itself to create an estoppel. The Court reversed with respect to Count III as well, holding that plaintiff's allegations respecting the contract elsewhere were not judicial admissions barring a claim for quantum meruit. With respect to the claim for accounts stated, the Court reversed, finding that plaintiff had adequately alleged that defendant had not disputed the amount owed. Finally, the Court reversed the dismissal of Count V, holding that the defendant's claim -- that plaintiff had not provided goods or services sufficient to justify its invoices -- went to the merits, and was thus beyond the scope of pretrial dismissal.

Link to Opinion

 

Pielet v. Pielet

Supreme Court Case Number: 112064

Appellate Court: Second District

Appellate Court Case Number: 2-09-0210 & 2-09-0242

Issues Presented: (1) Was plaintiff's cause of action for breach of a long-term consulting agreement viable against corporation under the Survival Statute, 805 ILCS 5/12.80, even though the agreement was not breached until five years after dissolution of the corporation? (2) Was the defendant relieved of its obligations under the contract pursuant to the doctrine of novation?

Appellate Court Opinion Summary: Plaintiff sued various entities for breach of contract and related torts, alleging that the defendants had breached a life-time consulting agreement signed by her late husband. The agreement was signed in 1986 with Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron and Metal, Inc. Two years later, the company sold an undivided one-half of its assets to PBS One, which expressly assumed the Consulting Agreement. Three years later, PBS One transferred its share in Pielet to National Material, whose general partner was NM Holding. In 1993, Pielet changed its name to Midwest Metallics, and in 1998, it ceased payments under the agreement. In Count IX, plaintiff alleged that National Material had assumed the obligations of PBS One to the consulting agreement, and NM Holding was liable as the general partner of National Material. In Count X, plaintiff alleged that National Material and NM Holding were liable as the successors to PBS One. Count XI alleged that PBS One remained liable on the agreement even after its dissolution. The Circuit Court entered summary judgment on all three counts, finding that PBS One had assumed Pielet's obligation; that the Survival Statute continued PBS's obligations in force, even though the breach of contract action did not accrue until later, and that National Material was liable on the basis of assumption, and as a "mere continuation" of the earlier entities. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that the fact that plaintiff's claim had not yet accrued was not a barrier to its survival under the Survival Statute, which preserves not merely "claims," but "rights" and "liabilities." The Court further held that plaintiff's contingent right to payment upon her husband's death survived until the statute, even though the husband did not die until later. Nevertheless, the Court reversed the judgment, finding that a triable issue of fact existed on whether a novation occurred by virtue of the formation of Pielet LP, or the husband's continued acceptance of payments from Pielet LP and Midwest Metallics.  

Appellate Court Opinion  

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U.S. Supreme Court Adopts Nerve Center Test for Corporate Citizenship in Diversity

A corporation's citizenship for purposes of Federal diversity jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1): a corporation is a citizen of the state of its incorporation, and the state where its principal place of business is found. This morning, in a decision certain to have a major impact on the day-to-day functioning of the Federal courts -- and attorneys' analysis of whether removal is available in a particular case -- a unanimous Supreme Court adopted a bright-line test for determining a corporation's "principal place of business." Friend v. Hertz Corporation, [pdf] No. 08-1107.

Until today, the circuits had been badly split on the proper test under Section 1332(c)(1). The Ninth Circuit -- which decided Friend -- applied a "place of operations" test, ignoring the corporate headquarters and considering where a company's plants, employees, retail locations and assets are located. Since California is the most populous state in the nation, the Court's test has meant, in practice, that national retailers -- even corporations strongly identified with other states -- are routinely deemed California citizens, making it impossible for many corporations sued in California state courts to seek removal to Federal court.

In contrast, the Third Circuit applied the "center of corporate activities" test, looking to the place where the corporation's day-to-day activity and management is centered. The Seventh Circuit applied the "nerve center" test, asking merely where the "brain" of the corporation is located. Finally, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits applied a "totality of the circumstances" test, considering the character, business purpose, nerve center, management center and general operations of the corporation. As the Supreme Court noted, Moore's Federal Practice treatise devotes fourteen pages to describing the circuits' various tests.

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California Supreme Court Provides New Guidance to Courts Making "Choice-of-Law"

Today, in a widely anticipated decision, the California Supreme Court held that California's interest in protecting a current resident does not trump another state's interest in having its laws applied. This occurred in the context of an asbestos case. The defendant's conduct occurred in Oklahoma, at a time when plaintiff was present in and a resident of that state, and Oklahoma has its own substantive law - that differs from California's - governing the defendant's potential liability for its Oklahoma acts. (McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC S162435). This decision should limit forum shopping and prevent California from becoming a litigation magnet for plaintiffs who seek to sue for injuries that might otherwise be time-barred.

Terry McCann was an Oklahoma resident in the 1950s. He claimed he was exposed to asbestos from a Foster Wheeler generator at a refinery in Tulsa in 1957. After his alleged exposure, he moved to California in 1975. He was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2005. He filed suit against Foster Wheeler in California state court.

Oklahoma has a 10-year statute of repose applicable to McCann's claim, which would bar McCann's lawsuit had he filed it in Oklahoma. However, McCann's suit was timely if measured by California's statute of limitations.

Foster Wheeler sought summary judgment, arguing that the timeliness of the action should be governed by Oklahoma law, rather than California law, and that under Oklahoma law McCann's cause of action against Foster Wheeler was barred by Oklahoma's statue of repose. The trial court agreed, finding that Oklahoma law governed the action, and McCann's claims were barred. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that McCann's residence in California at the time of his diagnosis trumped Oklahoma's interest in limiting liability embodied by its statute of repose.

The California Supreme Court disagreed: California's interest in affording a remedy to a current resident was insufficient to justify the choice of forum law over the law of another much more significantly involved jurisdiction.

GOTCHA! Ninth Circuit Reluctantly Dismisses Appeal That Was Timely When Notice of Appeal Was Filed

The Ninth Circuit recently found itself in the difficult position of having to dismiss an appeal that under its own precedent, was timely when filed, but became untimely after an intervening Supreme Court decision.

The plaintiffs brought a qui tam action against a researcher who allegedly made false statements to obtain funding from the federal government. (United States ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West, No. 07-16857 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2010).) Qui tam is a fancy Latin phrase for a private enforcement action alleging fraud on the government.

The United States has a statutory right to intervene in qui tam actions, but it declined to do so here. The district court entered judgment for defendants, and the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal 51 days later. But, you say, the time to appeal in federal court is only 30 days? Ordinarily true. But when the federal government is a “party,” the appellant has 60 days – not 30 – within which to appeal. (FRAP 4(1)(1)(B).) Under then-existing Ninth Circuit precedent, the government was a “party” to a qui tam – thereby allowing appeal within 60 days - even if it had declined to intervene. (Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., (9th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3d 1100.)

But the U.S. Supreme Court recently held otherwise. Resolving a circuit split, it concluded that when the government declines to intervene, the shorter, 30 day, time to appeal applies. (United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, New York (2009) 129 S. Ct. 2230.) The high court, while sympathetic to those who had relied on jurisdictions adopting the longer limit, deemed itself compelled to decide the jurisdictional question “irrespective of the possibility of harsh consequences.” (129 S. Ct. at 2236 n.4.) The Ninth Circuit strove mightily to avoid what it called this “inequitable” result, before it finally, relucantly, bowed to the inevitable.