Illinois Supreme Court Civil Issues Pending: Constitutional Law
[UPDATED THROUGH DECEMBER 24, 2011]
In re Torski C.
Supreme Court Case Number: 109623
Appellate Court: Fourth District
Appellate Court Case Number: 4-08-0952
Issue Presented: Is the definition of "dangerous conduct" found in the involuntary commitment statute void for vagueness?
Appellate Court Opinion Summary: Respondent was involuntarily committed to a mental health facility pursuant to Sections 1-104.5 and 1-119 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code. 405 ILCS 5/1-104.5, 1-119. Section 1-119 permits the involuntary commitment of any individual who is reasonably expected to engage in "dangerous conduct" which might include either threatening behavior or conduct that places the person or another in reasonable expectation of being harmed. Section 1-104.5 defines "dangerous conduct" as including conduct placing another individual in "reasonable expectation of being harmed," or a person's inability to guard himself or herself from serious harm because of his or her inability to provide for his or her basic physical needs. The Appellate Court held that the "reasonable expectation" language was unconstitutionally vague because it could be interpreted to apply to conduct that does not justify the deprivation of a liberty interest. This was so because, as written, the statute arguably applied to "the entire gamut of psychological, emotional, or financial harm, regardless of severity," and because the statute "poses a risk of arbitrary application to mentally ill individuals engaging in merely unusual or annoying behavior." The statutory definition for involuntary commitment was also problematic because -- inasmuch as the commitment standard was looser than the one applying to involuntary administration of psychotropic medications -- the statute created the possibility of an individual who could be admitted, but not treated.
Citations to Opinion: 395 Ill.App.3d 1010, 335 Ill.Dec. 405, 918 N.E.2d 1218
Wilson v. Cook County
Supreme Court Case Number: 112026
Appellate Court: First District, Division Three
Appellate Court Case Number: 1-08-1202
Issue Presented: Is Cook County's Blair Holt Assault Weapons Ban unconstitutional?
Appellate Court Opinion Summary: Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Blair Holt Assault Weapons Ban, Cook Co. Ordinance No. 06-O-50 (Nov. 14, 2006) was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, finding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, nor did the ordinance violate article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution or the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. Following the Appellate Court's affirmance, the Supreme Court entered a supervisory order directing the court to reconsider its ruling in light of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). The Appellate Court did so, and once again affirmed. The court held that the statute was did not bar the possession of weapons which were traditionally used for defense in the home; that the statute was neither vague nor overbroad, rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, and held that the plaintiffs had waived their argument that the ordinance violated article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution.
