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For the final day of our profile of retiring California Chief Justice Ronald M. George, we offer our own subjective list of the Chief Justice’s most notable opinions. If anyone has a nomination for a favorite case that belongs on this list – and there are many important opinions that aren’t here – explain in the comments section.

In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal.4th 757 (2008) – Reversing the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court held that provisions of the Family Code defining marriage as between a man and a woman violated the fundamental constitutional right to marry of all Californians. This was so for several reasons: (1) the exclusion of gay couples from the designation of marriage was not necessary to afford full protection to the rights and benefits accorded opposite-sex couples; (2) denying the designation "marriage" to same-sex couples would impose appreciable harm on such couples and their children; (3) denying same-sex couples the designation of "marriage" would be perceived as reflecting an official view that such relationships are of lesser dignity, and that same-sex couples and gay individuals are in some respects "second-class citizens."

Costa v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4^th 986 (2006) – In a legal challenge to Proposition 77, the Supreme Court found that where a challenger questioned whether an voter initiative was properly before the voters – as opposed to the substantive validity of the change in law made by the initiative – it should, as a general matter, be resolved before the election. The Court further held that technical deficiencies in referendum and initiative petitions should not invalidate the petitions if they are in substantial compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028 (2005) -- The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's refusal to follow an order which he or she reasonably believed to be discriminatory was a protected activity within the meaning of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, so long as the employee's communications to the employer sufficiently convey the employee's reasonable concerns that the employer has acted or is acting in an unlawful manner. The Court concluded that the appropriate test for determining an adverse employment action within the meaning of the statute was whether the action materially affected the terms and conditions of employment.

Miller v. Department of Corrections, 36 Cal.4th 446 (2005) – Reversing the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could establish an actionable claim under the FEHA by demonstrating, in a case involving a supervisor who allegedly gave favorable employment opportunities to a person with whom he was having an affair, that the sexual favoritism was so severe or pervasive as to alter his or her working conditions and create a hostile environment.

Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc., 21 Cal.4th 121 (1999) – In an action for employment discrimination and wrongful discharge, the trial court entered an injunction directing defendant to cease and desist from using derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at Hispanic/Latino employees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the injunction was not a prior restraint barred by the First Amendment. The Court pointed out that the vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment. Plaintiffs' speech, in contrast, had been adjudicated to be unprotected on the grounds that it contributed to a hostile working environment. The Court held that enjoining the continuation of unprotected speech was not contrary to the Federal or state constitution.

NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 1178 (1999) -- The Court held that as a general matter, the First Amendment protects the right of access to civil trials and proceedings. Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 124, a proceeding may not be closed unless the trial court provides public notice of the intent to hold closed proceedings; and after a hearing, expressly finds that (1) an overriding interest supports closure, (2) there is a substantial likelihood of prejudice to that interest absent closure, (3) the closure is narrowly tailored to protect the threatened interest, and (4) there is no less restrictive means available.

Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 17 Cal.4th 670 (1998) -- Plaintiff's application to serve as an assistant scoutmaster was rejected, and he sued under the Unruh Act, alleging that the rejection was on grounds of his homosexuality. The Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts were not a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act, noting that although the Scouts regularly engaged in business transactions with nonmembers, the primary function of the Scouts was to inculcate certain values in youth members. Nor did business transactions with nonmembers involve sale of access to the basic activities or services offered by the organization.

American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16 Cal.4th 307 (1997) -- The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment permanently enjoining the enforcement of a state statute requiring parental consent or judicial authorization before a minor may obtain an abortion. The Court acknowledged that certain parental consent laws had been upheld at the Federal level, but pointed out that the right to privacy protected by the state constitution was, in many contexts, broader and more protective of privacy than the federal right. The Court held that because the statute intruded upon an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, it was subject to scrutiny under the compelling interest test. The Court concluded that the statute could not be upheld on the grounds that it was necessary to protect the health of a pregnant minor, or to protect the minor's relationship with her parent.

Vons v. Seabest Foods Inc., 14 Cal.4th 434 (1996) -- In a case arising from an e coli outbreak, the Supreme Court held that the trial court could constitutionally exercise specific jurisdiction over a cross-claim between a meat supplier and certain franchisees. The Court pointed out that the cross-defendants' franchise agreements -- which specified that California law governed disputes -- controlled the purchase of ingredients, training, equipment and cooking procedures. The Court concluded that the cross-claim was sufficiently related to two contracts substantially connected to California -- the franchisees' franchise agreement, and their contract with the meat supplier -- to serve as a basis for jurisdiction.

Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 10 Cal.4th 594 (1995) -- In an action arising from a country club's termination of a woman's country club membership, the Supreme Court held that the Club was a "business establishment" subject to the Unruh Act. The Court emphasized the Club's interaction with the public: (1) the Club regularly permitted nonmembers to rent facilities for a fee; (2) the Club regularly obtained income from fees for the use of its facilities, and the purchase of food and beverages; (3) the Club obtained indirect financial benefit from the regular business transactions with nonmembers conducted on the premises. The Court also rejected the defendant's claim that subjecting the Club to the Unruh Act would violate its members' constitutional right to freedom of association.

Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296 (1992) -- In an action arising from an informal game of touch football, the Supreme Court granted review to determine the proper application of assumption of the risk, if any, following the adoption of comparative negligence. The Court held that the cases in which assumption of the risk had been applied could be divided into two classes: "primary assumption of the risk," referring to cases in which the court concluded that defendant owed plaintiff no duty to protect him from a particular risk; and "secondary assumption of the risk," meaning cases where defendant did owe a duty, but the plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk. The Court held that while "primary assumption of the risk" was still viable under a comparative negligence regime, "secondary assumption of the risk" was merged into the comparative negligence analysis. "Primary assumption of the risk," the Court found, depended not upon the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct, but rather on the nature of the activity or sport in which the defendant is engaged, and the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport.

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In the first two posts of this series, we've reviewed Chief Justice George's career prior to his judicial service, and his early years as a Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court and a Justice of the Court of Appeals. Today, we turn to a review of the Chief's more than eighteen years on the California Supreme Court.

 Chief Justice George was appointed to the Supreme Court by Governor Pete Wilson on July 29, 1991, replacing the retiring Justice Allen Broussard. "At the risk of being immodest," Governor Wilson said as he announced the nomination, "I don't see how I could have done better." The Judicial Nominees Evaluation Commission agreed with Governor Wilson's assessment, rating George "exceptionally well qualified." During his five years as a moderate member of the Lucas Court, the Chief Justice wrote a variety of important opinions for the Court on subjects such as civil rights, domestic relations and the California initiative system.

In late 1995, Chief Justice Lucas announced his retirement. Governor Wilson nominated George on March 28, 1996, as the twenty-seventh Chief Justice of California. Once again he received a rating of "exceptionally well qualified" from the JNE Commission, and the Chief Justice was resoundingly confirmed by the voters in 1998, winning retention by a three-to-one margin.

Chief Justice George's tenure has been a time of fundamental reform for California's court system. As the Chief Justice recalled earlier this year in a speech to the State Bar, he assumed office as Chief Justice in the midst of yet another state financial crisis. "I was determined to improve the fiscal security of the trial courts," he said. Many counties were facing "substantial closures and cutbacks in courtroom and clerk's office services as well as widespread employee layoffs." The Chief Justice's first major goal was achieved the following year when, in the waning hours of its legislative session, the Legislature enacted a bill creating a statewide system of funding for California's courts.

The second major reform of the Chief Justice's tenure came only one year later. When the Chief Justice took office, California's judiciary was a maze of over two hundred different superior and municipal courts. The result -- as the new Chief Justice observed in the course of visiting all fifty-eight of California's counties in those early years of his term -- was overlapping of services and inefficiency. As the Chief Justice recalled earlier this year: "Too often, courts were struggling in solitude to meet their obligations, without anywhere to turn. I found the equivalent of the wheel being reinvented in country after county."

All that changed in 1998 when the electorate approved a constitutional amendment permitting the counties' superior and municipal courts to unify into a single trial court for each county. Within three years, judges in every county had voted to unify.

In 2002, Chief Justice George achieved another major goal with passage of the Trial Court Facilities Act, which transferred responsibility, and in many cases ownership, of the 532 court facilities scattered around the state from the individual counties to the judicial branch. Six years later, a $5 billion revenue bond measure was approved, providing financing for forty long-overdue court construction and modernization programs.

The Chief Justice has received dozens of honors for his service throughout his judicial career. In recent years, these have included the James Madison Freedom of Information Award from the Society of Professional Journalists (2003), the Matthew O. Tobriner Public Service Award from the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco (2006), the American Judicature Society's Opperman Award for Judicial Excellence (2006) and the Champion of Justice Award from the Bar Association of San Francisco. In 2009, the Chief Justice was inducted as a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Join us tomorrow as we conclude our profile with our nominations for the Chief Justice’s most notable opinions.

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Yesterday, in the first post of this series, we considered Chief Justice George’s career prior to his elevation to the bench. Today, we continue with the Chief’s service on the trial bench and the California Court of Appeal.

The Chief Justice was appointed to the Los Angeles Municipal Court on April 20, 1972 by Governor Ronald Reagan. He was thirty-two years old. “I sort of felt and looked like the boy judge,” he told a newspaper reporter in 1996. He served as Supervising Judge of the West Los Angeles Branch of the Court in 1974-75, where he instituted several reforms, including a master court operation and seeing that forms were provided in Spanish translation. He was elected to a six-year term on the court without opposition in 1976.

Chief Justice George was elevated to the Los Angeles Superior Court on December 23, 1977, this time by a Democratic Governor – Jerry Brown. He was elected to six-year terms, again without opposition, in 1978 and 1984.

In 1981, then-Judge George was assigned to preside in the case of the Hillside Strangler, People v. Angelo Buono. The case nearly went off the rails in the pretrial stages when Kenneth Bianchi, an accused accomplice who had entered into a plea bargain agreement requiring him to testify, gave an unbelievable performance on the stand, ultimately testifying that he did not know whether he was telling the truth in saying Angelo was involved in the murders.

Concluding that Bianchi would never withstand cross-examination, the District Attorney’s office responded by moving to dismiss all ten counts of murder against Buono. In a courageous ruling, Judge George denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to corroborate Bianchi’s testimony and convict Buono. Not long after, the District Attorney withdrew from the prosecution, which was then undertaken by Attorney General George Deukmejian.

The trial was arduous -- jury selection consumed over three months, and the prosecution’s case involved more than a thousand exhibits and two hundred fifty witnesses. The Government’s closing argument took eleven days. But  finally, in the fall of 1983, what was at the time the longest criminal trial in U.S. history concluded with verdicts of guilty against Buono on nine of ten murder counts.

Following the Hillside Strangler case, George became Supervising Judge of the Criminal Division. On July 23, 1987, he was appointed to the Second District of the Court of Appeal, this time by Governor George Deukmejian.

Join us tomorrow as we review Chief Justice George’s nineteen years of service on California’s Supreme Court.

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On January 3, 2011, the twenty-seventh Chief Justice of California, Ronald M. George, will conclude over thirty-eight years of service on the California bench. To mark the retirement of this great California jurist, we begin a four part profile on state's third longest-serving Chief Justice.

Born in March 1940, Chief Justice George graduated from Beverly Hills High School in 1957. Following high school, the Chief attended the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. At the time, he planned to make his career in the Foreign Service.

All that changed at age nineteen, when he spent the summer between his sophomore and junior years in college hiking around West Africa and meeting American diplomats. "Most of them seemed to just be congregating amongst themselves and having very little contact with the local populace and not having much, if any, of an impact on the problems of the area," the Chief Justice recalled in a 1996 newspaper profile.

So he decided to attend law school. "I decided . . . that a law degree would offer the most options for whatever form of public service I might choose to pursue." The Chief Justice graduated from Stanford Law School in 1964.

Following law school, the Chief Justice joined the Attorney General's office as one of then-Attorney General Stanley Mosk's deputies. During seven years in the Attorney General's office, the Chief Justice handled a number of high-profile cases. The Chief was unsuccessful in one of his highest profile cases, People v. Anderson, where the Supreme Court struck down California's death penalty, but he prevailed not long after that in People v. Sirhan, where the Court affirmed the conviction of Sirhan Sirhan for assassinating Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

Chief Justice George served as counsel and argued six cases before the United States Supreme Court, including several which are still familiar to criminal law practitioners: Chimel v. California (invalidating warrantless search of entire house in connection with arrest of burglary suspect); Hill v. California (approving search incident to arrest, although police arrested the wrong person) and McGautha v. California (allowing jury to choose between life or death without governing standards not unconstitutional in capital cases) All together, the Chief Justice handled over one hundred appeals and writs, ending his career in the AG's office with a year as Administrative Assistant in charge of the Los Angeles office.

Join us tomorrow as we turn to the early years of the Chief Justice's judicial career.

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Resolving an express conflict between the District Courts of Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that when a party objects to instances of attorney misconduct during trial, and the objection is sustained, the party must also timely move for a mistrial in order to preserve the issue for a trial court’s review of a motion for new trial.  If the issue is not preserved in this manner, the conduct may still be subject to fundamental error analysis.  Ramiro Companioni, Jr. v. City of Tampa, 35 Fla. L. Weekly S738a (.pdf)

In the underlying case, Plaintiff sued the City of Tampa for personal injuries.  Throughout the trial, the City objected to several instances of misconduct on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel.  Although the objections were sustained, the City did not move for a mistrial.  After judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff, the City moved for a new trial alleging that the cumulative effect of opposing counsel’s misconduct throughout trial deprived it of a fair trial.  The trial court found that although Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct was so pervasive and prejudicial that it impaired the City’s right to a fair trial, the City had not moved for a mistrial and the conduct was not so extreme that “it would undermine the public’s confidence in the judicial system,” and on that basis denied the City’s motion.  The City appealed to Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal, which reversed the denial of a new trial based on the holding that the City’s contemporaneous objections to the misconduct were sufficient.  The Second District did not reach the separate issue of whether the complained of misconduct constituted fundamental error.  Because the Second District’s holding was in direct conflict with other appellate courts in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court accepted discretionary review.

The Court analogized the need for moving for a mistrial with the contemporaneous objection rule: 

“…failure to alert the trial judge that an error may be incurable results in delay and wastes judicial resources, especially if the error complained of occurs early on in the proceedings.  In cases such as the instant case where the trial judge sustains an objection, the trial judge is not put on notice that any further action is needed.  Without a request for mistrial or a curative instruction, the trial judge presumes that the objecting party has been satisfied that the error has been cured.”

As such, the Court quashed the Second District’s decision and remanded the case for consideration of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial under a fundamental error analysis.

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US Supreme Court Will Decide Fate of Preemption Defense for Generic Companies this Term

Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009), the Eighth Circuit (in Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009)) and the Fifth Circuit (in DeMahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010)) have both concluded that failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers are not automatically preempted by the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act’s (FDCA) requirement that generic labeling conform to the approved labeling for the innovator drug.  Last Friday, the United States Supreme Court agreed to decide whether a plaintiff’s state-law failure-to-warn claim against a generic drug manufacturer for failing to modify its labeling to include warnings that differ from the name-brand equivalent is preempted by the FDCA’s requirement that the label for a generic drug be the same as the label for the brand-name counterpart.  Against the advice of acting solicitor general, Neil Katyal, the Court agreed to address the issue in three cases Pliva v. Mensing, 09-993; Actavis v. Mensing, 09-1039; and Actavis v. DeMahy, 09-1501 and consolidated them for review. 

Since a majority of all drug prescriptions (approximately 75 percent) are now filled with generic drugs, the impact of this decision will be widespread.  The stakes are enormous for consumers and the generic pharmaceutical industry alike.

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Following the recent retirement of Justices Scotland and Sims, as well as the elevation of Justice Tani Cantil Sakauye to the California Supreme Court, the California Commission on Judicial Appointments has now confirmed four appointments for the Third Appellate District. First, Associate Justice Vance W. Raye, who has served on the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District since 1991, was confirmed as Presiding Justice. The Commission also confirmed three new associate justices for the Third Appellate District:

• Judge Elena J. Duarte, who has served on the Superior Court of Sacramento County since 2008, having also served as a Superior Court Judge in Los Angeles (2007-2008), and as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California (1994-2007).

• Ms. Andrea Hoch, who has served as the Governor’s Legal Affairs Secretary since 2005, having previously served as the Administrative Director of the Division of Workers’ Compensation (2004-2005) and in the Office of the Attorney General (1992-2004).

• Judge William J. Murray, Jr., who has served on the Superior Court of San Joaquin County since 1995.
   

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While avoiding the marijuana legalization debates raging in the state, the California Supreme Court confirmed that orders compelling five medical marijuana dispensaries to comply with subpoenas issued by the City of Dana Point were appealable, reversing the dismissal by the Court of Appeal in these consolidated cases. In Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court, S180365, the Court held that the order enforcing the legislative subpoena and compelling the production of documents was a final order for purposes of an appeal, returning the matter to the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, of the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. In doing so, the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the ancillary issue of whether an appealing party is entitled to a stay of enforcement of the subpoena pending appeal. Having resolved a split in the Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court disapproved Bishop v. Merging Capital, Inc.(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 180, People ex rel. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 526, and Barnes v. Molino (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 46, to the extent they are inconsistent with its holding. For more details regarding Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective, see the Appeals & Writs update page.

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Under Texas law, the public has an easement to access dry beaches. This easement extends landward to the vegetation line. A recent Texas Supreme Court case examined the validity of the easement when a hurricane suddenly alters the beachfront.

The property owner had constructed a house behind the vegetation line in the West Beach area of Galveston Island. Hurricane Rita caused sudden and dramatic beach erosion and the house was now seaward of the vegetation line. When the state attempted to enforce the public easement, the property owner initiated litigation in federal court arguing that the state was engaged in an unconstitutional “taking” of private property. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court regarding whether the public beach access easement “rolled” into previously unencumbered private property when storms altered the shoreline.

The Supreme Court distinguished between mere beach erosion and avulsion, a sudden and dramatic change in the shoreline. The beachfront is constantly changing due to natural forces and both the public and the property owner are properly charged with notice that their respective rights may be altered. In avulsion cases, however, the change is too sudden for the parties to adjust their behavior. Consequently, the public beach easement does not roll landward into previously unencumbered private property.

While the opinion provides some protection for property owners who build near beaches, it also places the precise boundary of the public easement into doubt. The vegetation line is no longer a reliable boundary in all cases.

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