California Supreme Court Short List Profiles: Stanford Law Professor Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

Appellate Strategist’s survey of potential nominees to the California Supreme Court  begins with Mariano-Florentino Cuellar. Cuellar graduated from Calexico High School in Calexico, California. After earning a bachelor’s degree from Harvard in 3 years (magna cum laude, 1993), he received a Master’s degree in political science from Stanford in 1996, followed by a law degree from Yale in 1997, and a Ph.D. from Stanford in 2000. He then served as law clerk to Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

Since the culmination of his clerkship in 2001, Cuellar has been a professor at Stanford Law School, first as an Assistant/Associate Professor and then, since June 2007, as a Full Professor and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar. According to his faculty biography, his work at Stanford involves “the intersection of law, public policy, and political science.” His courses deal with issues of administrative law, regulation and bureaucracy, executive power, and national security. 

Professor Cuellar’s tenure at Stanford has included governmental, as well as academic, endeavors. In fact, even before he assumed his faculty position at Stanford, he interrupted his Ph.D. program to serve as Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary (Enforcement) of the Treasury from 1997 to 1999, in which role he focused on financial crime enforcement, terrorism financing countermeasures, immigration, and border security. In 2008 and 2009, he served as Co-Chair of the Immigration Policy Working Group for the Obama-Biden Transition Project, where he worked to formulate policies on immigration, borders, and refugees. In 2009 and 2010, he served as Special Assistant to the President for Justice and Regulatory Policy, in which role he led the White House Domestic Policy Council’s work on criminal justice and drug policy; civil rights and liberties; immigration, borders, and refugees; public health and safety; rural development and agriculture policy; and regulatory reform.

Beyond Stanford, Professor Cuellar is associated with the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute, the American Constitution Society, the La Raza Lawyers’ Association of California, and the National Hispanic Bar Association, among others. He is married to former Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Lucy H. Koh, who is now a federal district court judge for the Northern District of California pursuant to an appointment by President Obama.

Because Cuellar has not served on the bench, his views on topics that might come before the Court must be gleaned from his writings and appearances in the media. A brief sampling of his academic writing is heavy on federal matters:

  • Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Political Economies of Criminal Justice, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 941 (2008) (responding to the proposition that politicians increasingly govern by framing social policy choices as criminal justice problems, and concluding that “reshaping the [crime-governance connection] to achieve more defensible social goals is a subtle enterprise. Sensible changes in criminal justice could almost certainly yield an acceptable social equilibrium less dependent on incarceration.”)
  • Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 227 (2006) (proposing an audit framework similar to “sample adjudication of class action” in lieu of the deferential or non-existent judicial review of executive decision-making and concluding “(1) Judicial review fails to constrain a broad range of discretionary executive decisions subject to mistakes or malfeasance. (2) The limitations of traditional judicial review do not imply that discretionary executive branch decisions should be immune from some form of review. (3) Arguments for broad executive discretion are often radically underdeveloped and fail to withstand scrutiny.”)
  • Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Antitreaty Discourse, 55 Stanford L. Rev. 1597 (May 2003) (arguing that the United States objects to the ICC on “process-oriented” grounds because a “focus on procedure sounds marginally more principled to international audiences than a brute realist assertion that American interests are best served by keeping unfettered control of military decisions.” “Yet this comes with costs: It elides the debate over the value of the brute realist position that American military power should be subject to few meaningful constraints and instead makes it look like the most important question is about the procedural shortcomings of a court that is precisely meant to address the arbitrariness in international criminal justice that critics use to assail it.”)

Professor Cuellar’s appearances in the media have often revolved around his role in shaping the Obama Administration’s immigration policy. His appointment to President Obama’s Immigration Policy Working Group was interpreted by experts as confirmation that President Obama was committed to comprehensive immigration reform.  Moreover, both the National Council of La Raza and the League of United Latin American Citizens greeted Professor Cuellar’s appointment with approval.

Though economic factors have put the immigration debate on the back burner, President Obama’s recent attempt to jump-start the issue suggests that his need for Professor Cuellar’s services may become more pressing in the near future. Whether that impacts Governor Brown’s appointment, or Professor Cuellar’s willingness to serve, remains to be seen.

Four New Civil Opinions Coming on Thursday at the Illinois Supreme Court

 The Illinois Supreme Court has announced that on the morning of Thursday, May 19th, it will file opinions in four civil cases (pdf):

  • General Motors Corporation v. Pappas, No. 108893-- (1) Does the 2005 amendment to the Property Tax Code, 35 ILCS 200/23-20, providing for the payment of interest on property tax refunds at the lower of 5% or the percentage increase in the urban CPI for the previous year, apply prospectively only? (2) Did trial court retain jurisdiction to grant judgment interest after the notice of appeal was filed? See Taxation.
     
  • O'Brien v. O'Brien, No. 109039 -- (1) Does the standard set in 735 ILCS 5/2-1101(a)(3) for a motion for substitution of a judge for cause, which requires a showing of actual prejudice, survive the due process standard set forth in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009)? (2) If so, where a party alleges that a judge has had ex parte communications with a party, does the statutory standard apply, or is the objective appearance of impropriety standard set forth in Rule 63(c)(1) of the Judicial Code applicable? See Civil Procedure.
     
  • The Board of Education of Auburn Community Unit School District No. 10 v. The Illinois Department of Revenue, No. 110395 & 110422 -- Does the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law ("PTELL") apply to all portions of a community unit school district following annexation of territory in a separate county which had not opted into PTELL? See Taxation.
     
  • Bell v. Hutsell – No. 110724 -- (1) Where defendants did not personally furnish alcoholic beverages, is liability for breach of a voluntary undertaking to monitor and inspect barred by the bar on civil social host liability? (2) Is there a private right of action under the Liquor Control Act for permitting one’s minor child or his or her invitees to possess, distribute or consume alcoholic beverages? See Tort Law.

 

Tags:

Against "Rough Justice" Part One: The Fidelity Imperative

In his recent article in the online magazine, Slate, Richard Thompson Ford discusses the key class action case, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, currently pending before the Supreme Court. Ford notes some of the problems of handling such an enormous number of claims as class actions. Under the Dukes trial plan, each class member’s entitlement to back pay will be determined by a mathematical model, without permitting Wal-Mart to challenge the merits of a particular class member’s claim.

Ford is okay with this because, in his view, “rough justice is better than no justice at all.” His rationale is revealing. He notes that proving individual discrimination is difficult and that “even if the statistics prove that Wal-Mart discriminated against a lot of women, very few would be able to prove they were one of them.”

Ford’s concern for “rough justice” is typical of advocates for procedures that aggregate many claims together for a single adjudication. Generally, these advocates worry about “false negatives” in civil litigation—the risk that a wrong will go unpunished rather than false positives—the risk that an innocent party will be forced to pay. While advocates of “rough justice” are right to worry that procedures should not be so cumbersome as to preclude legitimate claims, their proposed remedy is worse than the disease for several reasons. This post explores one of those reasons. Other reasons will addressed in future posts.

Ford’s concern that many women would be unable to prove a claim gives away the game. He advocates the class action approach not simply because it deals with numerous claims more efficiently, but because it allows persons to recover as part of an aggregated claim who would not have been able to recover as an individual claimant. It allows losers to become winners, not because the merits of the individual cases require that result but because weaknesses in individual claims are obscured when the dispute is litigated on a mass basis.

Ford’s argument is not really about class actions at all. His “rough justice” position ultimately boils down to a preference that a member of a group that has experienced discrimination should be permitted to recover, even if the particular individual cannot show that she has been affected by that discrimination.

Whatever the merits of this view, it is simply not the law. To obtain money damages, a plaintiff must show that she has been personally injured. Converting a case to a class action should not be permitted to change this result. The Rules Enabling Act prescribes that the rules of procedure are not to be used to alter a party’s substantive rights.

Procedural devices such as class actions are meant to implement the law more efficiently, not to change what a claimant must establish to win the case. Hence, the American Law Institute’s Principles of Aggregate Litigation speaks of the essential requirement of “fidelity” in all forms of aggregate litigation. Aggregation of claims must be used to implement the law faithfully, not to alter it. Indeed, to use class procedures to change the law is undemocratic. It alters the policy choice enacted by Congress when it restricted the back pay remedy to those who had personally been victims of discrimination.

It’s tempting to use techniques such as class actions as a kind of a short cut to justice. But too often such short cuts never reach the intended destination. Sometimes they take you places you never wanted to go.

Illinois Supreme Court Sets Civil Argument Schedule for May

On Friday the Illinois Supreme Court published its Call of the Docket [pdf] for the May term, and the Court will hear oral argument in five civil cases. The cases, with the issue or issues presented in each, are:

May 11:

Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Association,No. 110505 – Are the provisions of the Chicago Condominium Ordinance giving the right to compel production of documents, and authorizing interim awards of attorneys' fees, preempted by purportedly conflicting state law? See Civil Procedure.

May 17:

Sierra Club v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, No. 110882 – (1) Does a petitioner in an individual adjusted standard proceeding before the Illinois Pollution Control Board have a burden of proof with respect to the standards set forth in Section 27(a) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act? (2) Must the Board make written findings or identify substantive evidence supporting its resolution of the Section 27(a) factors in such a proceeding? (3) Do environmental activist groups have standing to seek judicial review of the Board’s decision in an individual adjusted standard proceeding? See Government Law.

Petersen v. Petersen, No. 110984 – Where a judgment of marital dissolution, ordering the payment of child support, expressly reserves the issue of each party's obligation to contribute to the college or other education expenses of the parties' children, is a subsequent order allocating such expenses a "modification" of the child support order within the meaning of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/510, such that only sums incurred on the notice date of the petition and afterwards may be awarded? See Domestic Relations.

City of Chicago v. Stubhub! Incorporated, No. 111127 – May municipalities such as the City of Chicago require electronic intermediary services to collect and remit amusement taxes on resold tickets? (Certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Case No. 09-3432, 624 F.3d 363.

Wirtz v. Quinn, No. 111903 – Does Public Act 96-34 violate the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution?  See Government Law.

Tags: