On November 5, 2013, the Florida Supreme Court heard oral argument in a case examining whether a release clearly and unambiguously releases the defendant from liability for a plaintiff’s physical injuries when the release does not expressly reference the defendant’s negligence.  See Sanislo v. Give Kids The World, Inc., 98 So. 3d 759 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (No. SC12-2409).

Give Kids The World, Inc. (“GKTW”) provides free vacations to sick children and their families at its resort.  Stacy and Eric Sanislo are the parents of a young girl with a serious illness who wished to participate in GKTW’s program.  The Sanislos executed a liability release in connection with a “wish request” that benefitted their daughter.  The release stated:

I/we hereby release Give Kids the World, Inc. . . . from any liability whatsoever in connection with the preparation, execution, and fulfillment of said wish . . . .  The scope of the release shall include, but not be limited to, damages or losses or injuries encountered in connection with . . . physical injury of any kind . . . .

I/we further agree to hold harmless and to release Give Kids the World, Inc. from any and all claims and causes of action of every kind arising from any and all physical or emotional injuries and/or damages which may happen to me/us . . . .

During the family’s stay at the resort, Mrs. Sanislo was injured.  The Sanislos sued GKTW, alleging that Mrs. Sanislo’s injuries were caused by GKTW’s negligence.  GKTW moved for summary judgment based on the release.  The trial court denied the motion and, following a jury verdict, entered judgment in favor of the Sanislos.  GKTW appealed, arguing that it was entitled to summary judgment because of the release.

While exculpatory clauses are disfavored under the law, unambiguous exculpatory contracts are enforceable unless they contravene public policy.  The Sanislos argued that the release was not clear and unambiguous because it applied to liability arising “in connection with the preparation, execution, and fulfillment of said wish” and that the nature and scope of the wish was not clear or defined.  The Fifth District stated that it has expressly “rejected the need for express language referring to release of the defendant for negligence or negligent acts in order to render a release effective to bar a negligence action.”  The Fifth District therefore held that the wish, which was requested by the Sanislos, clearly encompassed events at the resort related to their stay and that the Sanislos’ interpretation of the clause was not likely the interpretation that an “ordinary and knowledgeable person” would give it.  Thus, the release was sufficiently clear to make the Sanislos aware of the breadth of the scope of the release and what rights they were contracting away.  The court stated that the ability to predict each and every potential injury is not required to uphold an exculpatory provision within a release.

The Fifth District also considered the parties’ relative bargaining power in determining the enforceability of the release.  Florida courts have refused to find an inequality of bargaining power in recreational settings.  GKTW also argued that the bargaining power of the parties was not unequal, because the Sanislos voluntarily participated in the program.  The Sanislos disagreed and argued that they were given a contract and GKTW gave them no choice but to sign the release in order to participate in the program.  The Fifth District held that the bargaining power of the parties was not unequal; the Sanislos were provided with the release and they made a decision to waive certain rights in order to participate in the program.  The Fifth District reversed the trial court and certified conflict with the First, Second, Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal.

The author will update this article after the Florida Supreme Court has ruled.