Yesterday, the Illinois Supreme Court filed its long-awaited opinion in Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium AssociationAlthough on its face, Palm relates only to the enforceability of a Chicago city ordinance on document requests to condominium associations, if the dissenters on the Court are correct, it may have long-lasting impact on the Court’s construction of home rule authority.

Palm began in 1999, when the plaintiff sent the then-current condo association board a demand for production of documents, claiming they were necessary for him to investigate possible wrongdoing in several different areas. When the plaintiff’s request was denied, he sued.

The problem in Palm was simple: which law governed, the Chicago ordinance, which gave residents a nearly unrestricted right to demand production of documents, or state law, which limited the scope of such requests and gave associations more time to respond?

After a string of motions (and three separate dismissals without prejudice), the Circuit Court held that the Chicago ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s home rule authority. The court granted in part the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and ordered production of the documents plaintiff was seeking. The plaintiff then petitioned for an award of attorney fees. Although plaintiff acknowledged that he had paid his attorney $200 per hour, he submitted an expert affidavit stating that $300 was well within the market range. The court awarded the fees, approving the $300 rate, and certified the matter for immediate appeal. The Appellate Court affirmed.

In an opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Kilbride, the Supreme Court affirmed. “Home rule is based on the assumption that municipalities should be allowed to address problems with solutions tailored to their local needs,” the Chief Justice wrote. Although the General Assembly may preempt the exercise of home rule authority, it must do so expressly; the home rule clauses of the state constitution are intended to “eliminate or at least reduce to a bare minimum” instances of preemption by “judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intention.”

Home rule ordinances are evaluated according to a two-step test, the majority held. First, the court determines whether the disputed ordinance pertains to local government and affairs.   If so, the court then determines whether the General Assembly has preempted local power in the area. If it has not, the home rule jurisdiction may act in the area, even if the General Assembly has also legislated on the same issue.

Both sides agreed that the state statutes (the General Not For Profit Corporation Act and the Condominium Property Act) and the city ordinance at issue in Palm were completely irreconcilable. In the defendant’s view, that was enough to doom the ordinance as a permissible exercise of home rule authority, but the Court disagreed. Even though it was impossible to comply with both the state and city statutes, since the General Assembly had not expressly preempted home rule authority as part of the statutes, the city ordinance governed, and the plaintiff had a right to the documents he sought.

The majority then turned to the lower court’s attorney fees award. According to the city ordinance, plaintiff was entitled to recover “his reasonable attorney fees.” Construing the phrase as referring to whatever the local market rate was, the Court held that the plaintiff could legitimately recover an award of $300 per hour, despite having paid his attorney only $200 per hour. The Court rejected defendant’s argument that this was an unjustified windfall, pointing to testimony that the plaintiff would receive reimbursement only for his actual payments, and the attorney would retain the rest.

Justice Thomas filed a special concurrence in order to directly respond to the dissent. He began by sharply disputing the dissent’s conclusion that the city ordinance was invalid because it didn’t relate to the City’s local government and affairs, pointing out that not only hadn’t the defendant raised the argument, it had criticized the City of Chicago (which had intervened below to defend its ordinance) for even mentioning it. Even though the issue was not properly before the Court, Justice Thomas argued that the ordinance was well within the scope of home rule power. “[T]he dissent’s arguments,” he wrote, “show that, without a doubt, the dissenting justices are simply not comfortable with the system of home rule established by the Illinois Constitution.” As for the dissent’s objections to requiring the General Assembly to recite “magic words” before the Court would find local law preempted, Justice Thomas argued that the requirement came from the constitution, the Court’s own precedents, and the General Assembly itself. “If the legislature wants this to be an area of exclusive state control,” Justice Thomas concluded, “then the legislature can make it such with a single sentence.”

Justice Charles Freeman filed a lengthy dissent, with Justice Anne Burke joining. According to the dissenters, the decision “marks an unnecessary departure from settled law in two important areas – home rule jurisprudence and condominium law.”

Even though the defendant hadn’t challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it didn’t pertain to local government and affairs, the dissenters argued that the Court must address the issue, and it was in fact dispositive. The test, they wrote, for determining “whether a particular problem is of statewide rather than local dimension” involved considering “the nature and extent of the problem, the units of government which have the most vital interest in its solution, and the role traditionally played by local and statewide authorities in dealing with it.”

The legislative debates surrounding the Condominium Property Act made it clear, the dissenters argued, that the General Assembly considered the issue of demands for documents served on condominium associations to be a statewide problem requiring a statewide, uniform solution.  Since the City ordinance at issue did not pertain to local government and affairs, it exceeded the scope of permissible home rule and was unenforceable. And even if the City ordinance were enforceable, Justices Freeman and Burke disagreed with the majority’s ruling with respect to attorney fees too. Since the ordinance authorized the homeowner’s recovery of “his reasonable attorney fees,” the dissenters concluded that it merely authorized recovery of what the homeowner had paid, and no more.

The dissent closes with a call for legislative intervention: "Given the importance of balancing the rights of individual condominium owners against the right of association members as a whole, I urge the General Assembly to take action in this area."