With the Illinois Supreme Court asking somewhat fewer questions than it generally does, it was unclear how the Court might decide Rogers v. Imeri, the Dramshop Act case the Court heard last week.  Our detailed summary of the underlying facts and lower court decisions in Rogers is here. Our preview of the argument is here.

Rogers arises from the death of the plaintiff’s son in a drunk driving accident. The plaintiffs sued the bar which allegedly served the driver, alleging claims under the Dramshop Act. The plaintiffs received $106,550 from the driver’s liability insurance policy and their own policy. While the matter was pending, the defendant’s Dramshop liability insurer was declared insolvent, and the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund substituted in.

The parties agreed that the Fund was entitled to a $106,550 offset for settlements. So – was the offset deducted from the Dramshop Act cap, or from the jury’s verdict, with the sum capped at the statutory maximum? The question turns on a conflict between the statutory liability cap of the Dramshop Act — $130,338.51 — and the language of the Guaranty Fund Act. The Fifth District held that the offset was taken from the jury’s verdict – the same procedure which applies when the Fund is not involved in a case.

Counsel for the Guaranty Fund began by arguing that the issue presented was the import of the following language from the Act, 215 ILCS 5/546: “The Fund’s obligation . . . shall be reduced by the amount recovered or recoverable, whichever is greater” from other insurance.  Counsel pointed out that after the Fifth District’s decision in Rogers had come down, the First District, Division Five had decided the same question the opposite way in Guzman v. 7513 West Madison Street, Inc. Counsel argued that the Fifth District’s decision is contrary to the plain language of the Guaranty Fund Act, essentially directing that the trial court take a sum the Fund doesn’t owe (because of the Dramshop Act liability cap), and reducing it by another sum the Fund doesn’t owe (the setoff), to arrive at a number which would be exactly the same as if the Fund wasn’t involved in a case at all – meaning that Section 546 was given no effect. Justice Freeman asked counsel to reconcile his position with the express purpose of the statute to protect policyholders and third parties. Counsel responded that that was doubtless an aspirational goal of the statute. However, he argued that the Fund’s theory ensured that the purpose of the Dramshop Act is satisfied – the plaintiff recovers the full statutory liability cap, for the most part from the wrongdoer, with the Fund providing the rest. The Fund is protected as well by being given the reduction mandated in Section 546. Justice Freeman’s question was the only one counsel received in his initial remarks.

Counsel for the plaintiffs began with a discussion of the underlying facts. He argued that the case had nearly been settled when the Guaranty Fund substituted in. Counsel argued that Section 546 never mentions the Dramshop Act, which provides that a jury finds a victim’s damages without reference to the statutory cap. Justice Garman asked whether the issue was one of statutory construction or public policy, and counsel responded that it was largely statutory construction. Justice Theis asked what the “Fund’s obligation” under Section 546. Counsel responded that the term is never defined, and argued once again that the Fund’s position would vitiate the victim’s right to have the jury determine damages. Justice Karmeier asked counsel to respond to the Fund’s argument that the “Fund’s obligation” was capped by the Dramshop Act limit. Counsel argued that the Fund’s position was unsupported. Justice Karmeier asked whether the issue hinged on how the Court defines the “Fund’s obligation,” and counsel responded that the Fund’s obligation is determined through trial and the jury’s verdict. Counsel concluded by arguing that the Fund’s position would make trial a virtual formality, since the plaintiff could never get the full benefit of a verdict significantly above the statutory cap.

In rebuttal, counsel for the Fund argued that it was the Dramshop Act, not the Guaranty Fund Act, which capped the plaintiff’s damages. The plaintiff’s position, counsel argued, meant that the Guaranty Fund Act has no effect. Justice Thomas asked whether the Dramshop Act cap would always be the maximum exposure for the Fund, and the Fund would get the benefit of the setoff for other insurance recoveries regardless. Counsel argued that while this was true, applying the setoffs to a jury verdict which was well above the cap denied the Fund any benefit at all from Section 546.

We expect Rogers to be decided in two to four months.