In the recently concluded January term of the Illinois Supreme Court, the court heard arguments in five civil cases. Our reports begin with BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell. In BAC, an apparently skeptical Court heard arguments on whether a party’s waiver of his or her objection to personal jurisdiction could be limited to events happening after the waiver, as opposed to validating the entire history of a case, including events happening before the new party appeared. Our detailed summary of the facts and underlying court rulings in BAC is here.  The video of the oral argument is here.

The plaintiff filed its complaint in foreclosure in late 2009. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment of default was granted in 2010, and a judicial sale was held in September 2010. The plaintiff moved for an order approving the sale, which was granted in September 2011.

On October 23, 2011, the defendant finally appeared, moving to vacate approval of the sale, claiming to have never been served. That motion was withdrawn. Defendant moved to quash the approval order, or in the alternative, for relief under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 and 735 ILCS 5/15-1508. In April 2012, the plaintiff opposed, claiming to have completed substitute service on the defendant’s daughter.

Only one problem, according to the defendant: she didn’t have a daughter. No matter, the Circuit Court held: the defendant had waived her objections to jurisdiction by filing her initial motion to vacate the previous year.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that defendant’s first motion had waived any and all challenges to jurisdiction by failing to move to dismiss the action or quash service. Thus, plaintiff claimed, the defendant had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 2-301(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 15-1505.6 of the Mortgage Foreclosure Act for challenging personal jurisdiction Defendant responded that even if she had made a waiver – which she denied – it was only prospective and could not justify the foreclosure order already entered. The Appellate Court disagreed, holding that certain amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure enacted in 2000 had provided that "all objections to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person" were waived by an appearance. The defendant’s waiver of personal jurisdiction therefore operated both prospectively and retroactively, the court held.

Counsel for the defendant opened the argument at the Supreme Court. According to counsel, the case presented two questions: (1) did the defendant waive any objections to the court’s personal jurisdiction; and (2) if so, how broadly did the waiver operate? It was uncontested, counsel argued, that plaintiff had never properly achieved service.  Chief Justice Garman asked whether the issue of waiver had been raised by the defendant’s PLA. Counsel responded that it was, arguing that the defendant’s initial motion had only been withdrawn because the trial court had directed that it be. Justice Theis asked whether the court’s direction to withdraw the motion was in the record, and counsel responded that it was not. Justice Thomas asked whether it was time for In re Marriage of Verdung, heavily relied on by defendant, to be reexamined in light of subsequent amendments to Section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 1505 of the Mortgage Foreclosure Law? Counsel answered that Verdung remained good law. Justice Thomas asked whether the amendments to both statutes removed the prospective limitation on waivers of personal jurisdiction. Counsel responded that they did not, and argued that it would violate due process to hold that submission to jurisdiction subjected the defendant to all prior orders. Justice Freeman asked whether due process rights could be forfeited. Counsel answered no, particularly when the defendant had done nothing wrong. Justice Burke asked whether there was any evidence that Section 2-1301 motions should apply waivers both prospectively and retroactively. Counsel responded that the real purpose of the amendments to the statute was simply to eliminate the distinction between general and special appearances. Justice Thomas pointed out that three years had passed from the default to approval of the foreclosure sale, and asked whether holding that waiver was only prospective would reset the clock in the litigation. Counsel challenged whether proceeds had in fact taken three years. Even if it had, the amount of time passing was irrelevant, counsel argued. Service was mandatory. Plaintiff did not even claim that defendant had ever been validly served. Chief Justice Garman noted that defendant had made a general appearance, and counsel answered that the defendant had simultaneously moved to vacate on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The Chief Justice asked counsel whether the defendant had then moved to quash the order for possession of the deed. Counsel responded that defendant had never done anything but attack personal jurisdiction. Counsel urged the Court to clear the pending conflict of authority by reaffirming Verdung.

Counsel for the plaintiff began by arguing that the sole issue was the proper interpretation of the clear language of 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a)(5): "If the objecting party files a responsive pleading or motion . . . prior to the filing of a motion in compliance with subsection (a), that party waives all objections to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person." Verdung is twenty-five years old, counsel argued, and has been clearly overruled by subsequent statutes eliminating any limitation on the breadth of the waiver of personal jurisdiction. Justice Theis asked whether counsel was arguing that defendant’s having filed a motion to vacate in her first appearance doomed the defendant’s argument. Counsel responded that the issue of whether defendant had waived objections to personal jurisdiction was not properly before the court. Justice Theis asked counsel to comment on the fact that the defendant had raised her objections to personal jurisdiction over and over. Counsel responded that defendant had not asked that service be quashed in any of four post-judgment motions. Justice Burke asked counsel how the legislature had indicated that waiver was both prospective and retroactive. Counsel responded that the statute provided for waiver of "all" objections. Justice Burke asked counsel whether the global waiver created any due process concerns. Counsel responded that Section 2-301 had taken care of those concerns by providing a clear road map of what a defendant needed to do to object to jurisdiction, while still honoring finality.

On rebuttal, counsel for the defendant argued that everyone knows litigants sometimes enter appearances without ever actually being served. If the Court affirmed, such litigants would be required to examine the entire history of the litigation or risk being stuck with burdensome orders entered before the litigant appeared. Justice Kilbride asked counsel the basis for defendant’s first motion. Counsel answered that defendant’s original motion was based on a single argument: faulty service.   Justice Burke asked whether defendant was a pro se at the time, and counsel answered no. Justice Thomas asked whether defendant’s motions varied from the steps required by the statutory amendments. Counsel responded that Section 2-1401 specifically permitted a motion to vacate orders entered without jurisdiction. Justice Thomas noted that Section 2-1401 was for new actions, but counsel argued that it covered defendant’s post-judgment motions. Justice Thomas asked whether Section 2-1401 required service on the plaintiff. Counsel responded that plaintiff had waived service. Justice Kilbride concluded by asking what the practical difference was between the steps defendant actually took and a motion to quash. Counsel responded "absolutely none."

We BAC Home Loans to be decided in four to six months.