[UPDATED THROUGH September 12, 2016]
Stone Street Partners, LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings
Supreme Court Case Number: 117720
Appellate Court: First District, Division One
Appellate Court Case Number: 123645
Issue Presented: What is the proper remedy where an administrative notice of building code violations was served upon the property itself, not the business address or registered agent of the owner of the property?
Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186
Supreme Court Case Number: 120236
Appellate Court: Fifth District
Appellate Court Case Number: 150018
Issue Presented: How deferential is the standard of review govering downstate boards of education reviewing the decisions of hearing officers in connection with disciplinary proceedings for teachers?
Grimm v. Calica
Supreme Court Case Number: 120105
Appellate Court: Second District
Appellate Court Case Number: 2-14-0820
Issue Presented: Is the date on a business letter sufficient notice of service of an administrative decision to start the clock ticking on the deadline for filing a petition for administrative review?
Village of Bartonville v. Lopez
Supreme Court Case Number: 120643
Appellate Court: Third District
Appellate Court Case Number: 3-15-0341
Issue Presented: Are all disciplinary actions against public employees, up to and including termination, subject to a rebuttable presumption of arbitrability absent an express carve-out in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement?
The Hertz Corporation v. City of Chicago
Supreme Court Case Number: 119945
Appellate Court: First District, Second Division
Appellate Court Case Number: 1-12-3210
Issue Presented: Is the extension of the City of Chicago’s use tax on leased personal property to all rental car transactions occurring within three miles of the city’s border facially unconstitutional?
Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings: The Chicago Municipal Code imposes an 8% use tax on the rental of personal property within the city, or the use of personal property within the city that is rented outside the city. The Department of Revenue issued a second amended ruling, pursuant to authority granted in the applicable ordinance, explaining the application of the tax to car rental locations within three miles of the City’s border, where the locations are owned by companies which also do business in the city. The ruling states that the Department will not audit rental locations more than three miles from the city border (except for O’Hare field). The Department assumes that vehicles rented by drivers with city addresses on their licenses will be used more than 50% of the time in the city, and are thus subject to the tax. Where the driver’s license does not bear an in-city address, there is a rebuttable presumption that the use of the vehicle is not taxable. The ruling further provides that lessors may obtain a check-box response from lessees stating whether or not the vehicle will be used more than 50% of the time inside the city, the Department will accept the statement as sufficient proof of use. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop enforcement of the ordinance, arguing that (1) the amended ruling was an extraterritorial exercise of Chicago’s home rule authority; (2) the ruling was beyond the scope of the ordinance; and (3) the ruling violates the due process and commerce clauses. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding the ordinance and ruling unconstitutional. The Appellate Court reversed. As for the notion that the tax was extraterritorial, the Court held that the tax was on the use of the vehicle, not on the rental transaction which took place outside of the city limits. Since the ruling was limited to car rental companies which did business within the city, the city was permitted to task those companies with the duty to collect the tax, where applicable. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and commerce clause challenges on the grounds that the tax was levied on the use of the vehicles in the city, not on the rental transactions.
Bueker v. Madison County, Illinois
Supreme Court Case Number: 120024
Appellate Court: Fifth District
Appellate Court Case Number: 5-14-0473
Issue Presented: Did the plaintiffs, individuals allegedly injured by the official misconduct of the former treasurer and collector of Madison County, have standing to directly sue the issuer of the former treasurer’s public official bond?
Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings: The plaintiffs filed a multi-count complaint, seeking redress for injuries they allegedly suffered from the official misconduct of the former treasurer and collector of Madison County. Count VII of the plaintiffs’ complaint was brought directly against the issue of the former treasurer’s public official bond. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss with respect to Count VII, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue directly on the bond. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Court noted that the statutes requiring both the treasurer’s and collector’s bonds require that the bonds be drawn in the name of “the People of the State of Illinois.” However, the former treasurer’s bond was actually drawn in the name of “Madison County Government.” The Court held that although public official bonds are drawn to protect the interests of those injured by official misconduct, standing to sue must be found in the express language of the bond or the authorizing statute. The Court held that the statutory reference to “the People of the State of Illinois” referred to the body politic, not to individual citizens of the county. Accordingly, neither the bond itself nor the underlying statute created a private right of action, and the dismissal of the claim against the bond issuer was affirmed.
Bremer v. City of Rockford
Supreme Court Case Number: 119889
Appellate Court: Second District
Appellate Court Case Number: 2-13-0920
Issue Presented: Is Section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, which provides that when a covered employee sustains a “catastrophic injury,” the employee is entitled to the additional benefit of having his or her health insurance premiums, as well as those of his or her partner and/or dependent children, paid by the employer, triggered when a firefighter is awarded an occupational disease disability pension?
Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois
Supreme Court Case Number: 120343
Appellate Court: Fourth District
Appellate Court Case Number: 4-14-0941
Issue Presented: Did the members of the defendant Board take “final action” within the meaningof the Open Meetings Act when (in a closed meeting) they signed a contract with the outgoing superintendent, but did not date their signatures, when the entire agreement was subsequently posted on the Board’s website prior to a public meeting, when the agreement was called for a vote and publicly approved?
Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC
Supreme Court Case Number: 120526
Appellate Court: Certified Question from U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Appellate Court Case Number: Seventh Circuit No. 15-2332
Issue Presented: Does the Illinois Commerce Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over a reparation claim, as defined by the Illinois Supreme Court in Scheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 353 Ill.Dec. 299 (2011), brought by a residential consumer against an Alternative Retail Electric Supplier, as defined by 220 ILCS 5/16-102?
Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings: The plaintiff allegedly began purchasing her electricity from the defendant after receiving an offer promising lower electricity rates. Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against defendant in late 2014, alleging violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing that the Illinois Commerce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over any claim like the plaintiff’s seeking damages in connection with rates charged. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed to the Seventh Circuit.