Governor Brown Nominates U.C. Berkley Law Professor Goodwin Liu to California Supreme Court

Governor Jerry Brown has acted to fill the California Supreme Court vacancy created by the retirement earlier this year of Associate Justice Carlos R. Moreno by nominating U.C. Berkley law professor Goodwin Liu to the post. 

Professor Liu, 40, has never been a judge, but recently garnered headlines as President Obama’s nominee for a seat on the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. His confirmation was blocked by Senate Republicans, citing his legal philosophy and despite support from prominent legal conservatives Kenneth W. Starr and Richard Painter. He ultimately withdrew his nomination

Professor Liu is the son of Taiwanese immigrants. He was born in Georgia, but raised in Sacramento where, according to his CV, he attended public schools. He graduated Stanford in 1991 with a bachelor’s degree in biology, then went to Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship, where he took a masters degree in philosophy and physiology. “Upon returning to the United States, he went to Washington, D.C., to help launch the AmeriCorps national service program and worked for two years as a senior program officer at the Corporation for National Service.” 

Professor Liu’s career in the law began upon graduation from Yale Law School in 1998, whereupon he clerked for Judge David Tatel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He then worked “as Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education, where he developed and coordinated K-12 education policy.” A U.S. Supreme Court clerkship with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg followed, then a stint in O’Melveny & Myers’ appellate litigation practice in Washington, D.C. Since joining the Boalt Hall faculty in 2003, he has ascended to the rank of Associate Dean and Professor of Law while establishing himself as a nationally recognized expert on constitutional law, education policy, civil rights, and the Supreme Court. 

He is also a prolific and influential legal scholar. Some of his more recent publications include:

  • Keeping Faith With The Constitution (2009) (with Pamela S. Karlan and Christopher H. Schroeder);
     
  • The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 77 (2009);
  • National Citizenship and the Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity, in The Constitution in 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009);
  • Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 Stanford Law Review 203 (2008).

Reach of Litigation Privilege To Be Tested By Florida Supreme Court

In a day and age when every other day there seems to be a sex scandal involving a politician’s “indiscretions,” the Florida Supreme Court has been asked to examine a legal issue arising out of an alleged sex scandal. In DelMonico v. Traynor, No. SC10-1397, the Court must determine whether an attorney is protected by the litigation privilege against claims for defamation and tortious interference when he related to another party’s ex-spouses and former business associates during witness interviews that the party used prostitutes to entice business clients. The Court accepted the case for review based on conflict with the Court’s prior decision in Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell P.A. v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., 639 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994). The district court’s decision is reported at 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), and the slip opinion can be found here. The Court heard oral argument on June 9, 2011.

The District Court’s Decision. The district court affirmed the application of the privilege to bar the claims against the attorney and his law firm. Over the dissent of one judge, the district court held that “[b]ecause the statements complained of were made by the [attorney] while he was acting as defense counsel in the underlying litigation, and the statements bore ‘some relation’ to the proceeding, they were absolutely privileged as a matter of law.” 

The dissent, on the other hand, questioned whether a qualified, rather than absolute, privilege applied since the attorney’s defamatory statements targeted a person outside a “judicial proceeding.”  It then concluded that disposition by summary judgment was not appropriate because “there remain disputed issues of material facts as to whether the attorney made the statements and whether they were made with the intent to injure the appellant.”

Review before the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court accepted review of the case based on express and direct conflict with its decision in Levin Middlebrooks which held that “absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a defamatory statement or other tortious behavior . . . so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.” Petitioners asserted that the district court’s holding conflicted with Levin Middlebrooks “by applying an absolute privilege to statements defaming a party outside of a judicial proceeding, at a time when the defamed party and/or his lawyer are not present, not provided an opportunity to be heard, and not able to have any judicial recourse because the defamatory statements are not made in the ‘course of the judicial proceeding.’”

In sum, the issue before the Court turns on the meaning of the phrase “course of judicial proceeding.” Does the “course of judicial proceedings” requirement become non-issue once a lawsuit is filed? Does it sweep into its net comments made during potential witness interviews outside the presence of the defamed party or a judge? Does the term require that the statements be made during a formal discovery process (e.g., deposition, answer to interrogatories), a court filing, or in open court? In the end, the Court will have to balance “the chilling effect on free testimony” versus “the right of an individual to enjoy a reputation unimpaired by defamatory attacks” based on the facts of this case.

Employers Liable Only Once For Employee Negligence – California Follows the Majority Rule

Under respondeat superior, an employer is held vicariously liable for the acts of an employee when driving a vehicle within the scope of employment, irrespective of any fault by the employer. Alternatively, an employer can be directly liable for its own negligence under the theory of negligent hiring/retention or negligent entrustment. As a practical matter, a plaintiff injured by the driving employee can allege all such theories; however, does that remain true once the employer admits liability under respondeat superior?

In Armenta v. Churchill (1954) 42 Cal.2d 448 (Armenta), the California Supreme Court held that once an employer admits liability under respondeat superior for an employee driver, the plaintiff is then barred from also pursuing a claim of negligent entrustment. The Court concluded that these were merely two alternative theories for holding an employer liable for the same injury. Under the “all of nothing” principles then in place, an employer would either be held for 100% of the damages, or none at all, regardless of the theory used. However, since Armenta, California has adopted comparative negligence principles and voters enacted Proposition 51, creating mechanisms for parsing out the separate liability of each party involved. As a result, the courts of appeal split as to the continuing viability of Armenta, with the Court of Appeal in Diaz finding that Proposition 51 required a separate evaluation of the employer’s direct liability.

In Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) ___ Cal.4th ___, S181627, the unanimous Supreme Court has resolved the conflict below and upheld Armenta, noting that this remained the majority rule in the U.S. The Court first dismissed the purported distinction between a claim of negligent entrustment (Armenta) and negligent hiring (Diaz), noting these were “functionally identical” when addressing an employee driver. The Court also found it made no difference whether the employer conceded vicarious liability before or during trial. As to the main issue, the Court sided with Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, finding that the employer’s liability cannot exceed that of the employee driver who allegedly caused the accident, and that nothing in the development of negligence principles since Armenta had changed this. As a result, once vicarious liability for the employee is conceded, making the employer fully liable for the employee’s actions, the additional claims of negligent entrustment or negligent hiring become duplicative and superfluous and must be barred. Indeed, the Court noted the inherent inequity of holding the employer for a second share of liability in excess of the negligent driver’s liability, and remanded for a full retrial. For more details about Diaz, see the Torts & Products update page.
 

The Upshot: What Wal-Mart v. Dukes Means for Future Aggregate Litigation

The Supreme Court’s decision overturning the certification of the massive gender discrimination class in Wal-Mart v. Dukes [pdf] has been well-publicized. We go behind the headlines, therefore, to offer a few educated guesses as to what the case will mean for the future of class actions and other forms of aggregate litigation:

  • Statewide classes barred on state law will become more common as claimants will seek friendlier state jurisprudence on the commonality question;
     
  • Some counsel will seek to litigate claims through “mass actions” of large numbers of individual claimants rather than face rigorous class action requirements;
     
  • Greater care will be taken in framing class definitions to meet Wal-Mart’s more rigorous commonality standards;
     
  • The practice of “smuggling” monetary claims into purported injunctive class actions will stop;
     
  • Attempts to bring medical monitoring claims as injunctive class actions will face increased scrutiny;
     
  • Merits-related evidence will usually be essential at certification hearings;
     
  • Expert testimony at the certification stage will be subject to Daubert scrutiny;
     
  • The unanimous rejection of “trial by formula” will stifle “creative” attempts to dispose of aggregated claims by denying the defendants’ right to present individual defenses. “Bellweather” trials will not be binding.

Thomas & Lincoln on Appellate Practice: Your Credibility is Everything (The Bryan Garner Interviews IV)

"You don’t want to lose credibility," Justice Thomas told Bryan Garner during their 2007 interview [pdf]. "That is the one thing you bring with you. And if you lose it, it’s hard to get it back."

A lawyer’s credibility is his or her stock in trade, and that’s especially true in the appellate courts. Appellate judges rely on the lawyers before them to give an honest account of the facts below, and enter into an open dialogue about the application of the law to those facts. As Justice Kennedy said, "I’ve learned that the judges really want your help."

Few lawyers would question the proposition that they have a duty to be fair and honest about the facts and the record. Justice Ginsburg points that out in her interview with Garner: "if a brief-writer is going to slant something or miscite an authority, if the judge spots that one time, the brief will be distrusted – the rest of it." Nevertheless, it happens, at least in the intermediate appellate courts. After twenty-five years practicing in the appellate courts, I’ve certainly seen record cites that don’t support the accompanying factual assertion. And once in a great while you see brief-writers whose discussion of a few key authorities stretches the boundaries a little too far.

The justices remind us to be scrupulous about the little things. The first and last thing I do with every brief is to review the applicable court rules – a habit I learned with my first appellate brief, when a senior partner reminded us that we would not under any circumstances be getting any non-compliance calls from the court clerk. Proofread carefully and repeatedly — Justice Stevens observes that he "almost never" reads a brief with no typographical errors, but Justice Scalia told Garner that typographical errors undermine your credibility: "It just shows you’re not careful." Particularly with courts of discretionary jurisdiction, Justices Thomas and Kennedy both note that some attorneys insist that the cases stand for more than they really do. "[W]e know that’s not true," Justice Thomas said. "That’s not advocacy; that’s just being dishonest."

But protecting your credibility goes deeper than that. As Justice Thomas says: "I think when you give ground, you gain credibility. When you hold ground that you don’t deserve, you do not gain credibility; you lose credibility." Bringing arguments with no chance of success is not a cost-free exercise in the appellate courts. Filing a petition for review at your state Supreme Court claiming that half a dozen issues are worthy of review — or devoting an appellate brief to what’s really a jury argument — merely tells the court that you don’t understand its mission.

Justice Thomas’ advice reminded me of a story about Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln’s friend Leonard Swett tried dozens of cases while riding circuit with Lincoln, both as his co-counsel and his opponent. After Lincoln’s assassination, Swett told Lincoln’s biographer (and former law partner) William Herndon:

As he entered the trial, where most lawyers would object, he would say he reckoned it would be fair to let this in, or that . . . When the whole thing was unraveled, the adversary would begin to see that what he was so blandly giving away was simply what he couldn’t get and keep. By giving away six points and carrying the seventh he carried his case, and the whole case hanging on the seventh, he traded away everything which would give him the least aid in carrying that.

Justice Thomas and President Lincoln have important advice for our practices. Most appellate judges glance at the counsel signature block when they pick up a brief. Strive to give them a sigh of relief when they see your name on the brief, because they know your record cites will say what you claim, your cases are correctly cited, your brief is complete and intellectually honest; in short, that you’ve given them the help they want.

Learning to Love Oral Argument (and Persuade the Court While You’re At It) — The Bryan Garner Interviews III

My favorite part of my job is oral argument. A well-prepared oral argument with a hot bench is everything that draws a lawyer into appellate practice — a fast-paced but thoughtful give-and-take about what the law is, and where it should go. As Justice Scalia told Bryan Garner, “I think good counsel welcomes, welcomes questions.”

Still, nothing in appellate practice has more capacity to keep lawyers pacing the floor at night.

As you might expect, Bryan Garner’s Supreme Court interviews contain detailed advice for preparing for oral argument, enjoying the process, and even persuading the court to your client’s point of view while you’re at it.

One of the most difficult skills to learn in appellate argument is how to stay on message despite a hot court. Inexperienced advocates tend to become wedded to a speech, or at least an inflexible outline. When the questions start flying, they can’t adapt their presentation, and sometimes they wind up committing the cardinal sin of responding to a question with "I’ll get to that in a moment." You’re there to answer the court’s questions, nearly to the exclusion of all else. Evade, stall or equivocate, and you try the court’s patience and risk your credibility. Answer the question. Immediately.

Chief Justice Roberts offers a great suggestion for mastering the skill of adjusting your argument on the fly to fit the flow of questioning. He points out that every argument breaks down to just a few points – call them A-D. Put each point on an index card. During your practice sessions, shuffle the cards as you’re introducing your argument, then look down and take your points in the order you see — if the first card says point "C," then begin there. That way, if a judge interrupts in the first two minutes and wants to move straight to your final point, your presentation will flow smoothly from there through your other points.

As Jay O’Keeffe argued on his appellate blog De Novo last year, moot court practice sessions are an absolutely essential part of preparing for most cases. Today, more cases than ever are resolved on the briefs; oral argument doesn’t change the result. But you can never predict whether your case will be one of the exceptions, so you have to be ready. Know the record and know the cases: "as a lawyer," the Chief Justice told Garner, "you’ve got to be prepared to answer a thousand questions. You might get eighty, you might get a hundred, but you’ve got to be prepared to answer more than a thousand." Although predicting the hard questions the court might ask is an indispensable skill for an appellate lawyer, you’ll need help from your colleagues. The Chief Justice recalled:

I would do countless moot courts early on. For a Supreme Court case, certainly five, maybe as many as ten. I’d do them over and over again, and it paid off enormously in terms of generating familiarity with the types of questions people would ask and also developing a comfort level with answering.

The Chief Justice reminds us to resist the urge to staff your moot court with people who might be expected to be sympathetic to your client’s position. If your client is a criminal defendant, find three former prosecutors for your sessions. If you’re representing a corporate defendant, find a former plaintiff’s lawyer. Answering the easy questions doesn’t do you any good; you want the hostile ones. Strive to walk out of your argument thinking it was easier than your moot courts.

I’ll conclude with my own tip: listen and learn. Become a fan of the great oral advocates. Check out the oral argument audios at the Oyez Project. Pick up a few of Peter Irons’ May It Please the Court book-and-audio collections and listen during your commute (just hope nobody asks what’s on your iPod playlist).

Join us back here tomorrow for the conclusion of our four-part series on Bryan Garner’s SCOTUS interviews in LawProse.

Appellate Brief-Writing 101: “Every Lawsuit is a Story” (The Bryan Garner Interviews II)

"God created man because he loved to hear stories," goes an Ethiopian proverb.

You might think that narrative has little or nothing to do with writing a good brief. But as Professor James Boyd White reminds us, "The law always begins in a story . . . It ends in a story, too." Chief Justice Roberts tells Bryan Garner in the LawProse interviews that story-telling is central to writing a compelling statement of facts:

It’s got to be a good story. Every lawsuit is a story . . . I don’t care if it’s about a dry contract interpretation; you’ve got two people who want to accomplish something, and they’re coming together — that’s a story. And you’ve got to tell a good story . . . you want it to be a little bit of a page-turner, to have some sense of drama, some building up to the legal arguments.

People are natural story-tellers; stories are an innate way for us to order and interpret all of human experience. As Barbara Tuchman wrote, "narrative is the life-blood of history." Telling a story in your brief that fits an established paradigm gives the result you want an internal consistency — any necessary inferences you’re asking the judge to make will seem reasonable. If you frame your story well, your desired result will have the virtues of fidelity — stories the decision maker knows to be true — and ideals — consistency with what the decision maker wants to be true. Tapping into stock stories and myths, like Joseph Campbell’s archetypal stories, is a powerful tool of persuasion.

The elements of story-telling are directly applicable to our craft, as several commentators have shown in recent years, see here [pdf] and here [pdf] and here. [pdf]. Every lawsuit occurs in a setting, of course — the factual background and the governing law. As in every good story, conflict takes center stage, and here, the lawyer must make a decision — is the story one of person against person? Against self? Against nature? Against society? The theme of a persuasive brief should define the central conflict in terms of the characterization, casting the story in a light the decision maker can identify with. And finally, all cases have a plot: set-up, complication, and finally, resolution, showing that the law must arrive at the result you’re seeking.

Point of view is central to all legal writing. Consider how different several famous cases of recent years sound, depending on which side’s version you read:

The Rod Blagojevich Case:

The Prop 8 Case:

  • A radical departure from long-settled tradition.
     
  • Vindication for equal treatment under the law.

The Bill Clinton Case:

  • The President is degrading his office.
     
  • Impeachment is a political power-play.

"It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular result," Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in The Common Law, "but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." From Justice Holmes to Chief Justice Roberts, great advocates have always known that every brief — indeed, every case — must begin with a strong narrative.

Join us back here tomorrow for Part III of our four-part series on Bryan Garner’s SCOTUS interviews in LawProse.

Four New Civil Opinions Coming From the Illinois Supreme Court

The Illinois Supreme Court has announced that on the morning of Thursday, June 16, it will file opinions in four civil cases [pdf]:

  • Studt v. Sherman Health Systems, No. 108182 Does the Illinois pattern jury instruction on professional negligence (Civil No. 105.01) correctly state the applicable standards? See Tort Law.
     
  • Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 110166— Does a complaint seeking both injunctive relief and damages in connection with defendant’s alleged failure to timely restore power after storms, and to give priority in restoring power to customers dependent on electric life support system, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce Commission? See Tort Law.
     
  • Genius v. County of Cook, No. 110239— Does the Cook County Employee Appeals Board have jurisdiction to decide disciplinary charges against an officer based on abolished rules? See Government Law.
     
  • Snyder v. Heidelberger – No. 111052 — Does a quitclaim deed intended to create a joint tenancy between a husband and wife cause an injury within the meaning of the statute of repose for legal malpractice actions, 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3, when the deed is executed and recorded, when the husband dies and the alleged error can no longer be rectified, or both? See Tort Law.

Good Legal Writing Is Just Good Writing – Bryan Garner’s SCOTUS Interviews, Part I

In 2006 and 2007, legal writing icon Bryan Garner had an amazing opportunity — he interviewed eight of the nine then-sitting Justices of the United States Supreme Court on legal writing and appellate advocacy. The videotapes have been posted on Garner’s LawProse site for a while now, but last year, Garner made the Justices’ advice even more accessible, reprinting the transcripts in the journal he founded for the American Society of Legal Writers, the Scribes Journal of Legal Writing.

The transcripts have generated quite a lot of buzz around the law blog world, with posts and commentary at The Wall Street Journal’s blog,  Rebecca Copeland’s Record on Appeal, A Legal Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, the Rocky Mountain Appellate Blog and The Legal Times, among many others. Today we begin a four-part series of commentaries on the Garner interviews.

Lawyers are driven, busy people. Sometimes the last thing we want to do on our off hours is read even more. But one of the primary lessons the Justices have to teach us is that there’s no special secret to good legal writing; good legal writing is just good writing. As Justice Kennedy said,

I tell my law clerks, sometimes you can’t write anything good because you’ve never read anything good.

Chief Justice Roberts agreed: "the best teachers of writing are good writers who you read." Many of the Justices mentioned great writers they admire outside of the law. Justice Kennedy reads Hemingway, Shakespeare and Dickens. Justice Ginsburg mentioned the influence of one of her Cornell professors, the great Russian novelist Vladimir Nabokov. Justice Breyer mentioned Montesquieu, Stendahl and Proust.

All writing teachers highlight the importance of editing, and the Justices are no exception. Justice Scalia notes that he revises his own work "over and over again." Justice Thomas argues that "simplicity and clarity" requires "a lot of rounds" of "fairly intense" editing.

Strive for brevity in your legal writing, the Justices advise. Justice Breyer makes the point that a brief which is well below the Court’s page limit conveys the author’s confidence in his argument: "he thinks he’s really got the law on his side because he only took up 30." Chief Justice Roberts tells a story about clerking for Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist reviewed one of Roberts’ draft opinions, and circled material throughout the draft. "Put it all in footnotes," he directed. When Roberts returned the draft to him, Rehnquist told him: "Now cut out all the footnotes." Brevity is a hard lesson for lawyers to learn, but the fact is, nearly everything we write would be improved if we cut five percent of the words, just as an exercise in streamlining and simplifying. Then do it again.

All of the Justices have their personal preferences, of course, and as is probably inevitable in a group of nine people, some of them contradict each other. Chief Justice Roberts thinks it’s okay to add a few facts to your statement of facts that don’t directly bear on the issue if it adds a little human interest. Justice Alito mentions that briefs and draft opinions tend to be full of dates that have no impact on anything. Justice Scalia never reads the summary of argument, but Justice Thomas nearly always does. Justices Scalia and Alito use footnotes; Justice Breyer never has. Justice Kennedy doesn’t think sentences should begin with "moreover" or "however" or "but," but Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito all endorse the practice. Justice Kennedy dislikes nouns that have been turned into verbs – he mentions “tasked” and “impact” and words ending in “-ize” — and thinks most adverbs can be cut. Justices Kennedy and Scalia both suggest deleting trendy words. But there’s one thing all the Justices agreed on — legalese, particularly Latin, is almost never a good idea. Justice Scalia proposes the cocktail party test — if you’d get a funny look for saying it at a cocktail party, don’t put it in your brief.

Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed that bad writing can lose a strong case, and good writing can win a marginal one. In the final analysis, according to Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, lawyers are professional writers. As Justice Ginsberg observed:

 I think that law should be a literary profession.

Join us back here tomorrow for Part II of our four-part series on Bryan Garner’s SCOTUS interviews in LawProse.

Extending the Economic Loss Rule to Service Contracts in Arizona

From time to time, I’ve reported on important new decisions from around the country on the scope of the economic loss rule, see here, and here, and here. Last month, the Arizona Court of Appeals gave the defense bar an important new precedent, extending the economic loss rule to service contracts.

First, to review: economic losses are frustrated commercial expectations: “it wasn’t worth what I paid,” or “it broke,” or “I didn’t make as much money as I expected.” The economic loss rule, simply stated, holds that where a plaintiff has suffered nothing but economic losses, tort claims are barred, and he or she must sue, if at all, on the contract. Most states have found that the economic loss rule arises from a desire to promote contractual certainty by holding parties, in the vast majority of cases, to their bargain.

Cook v. Orkin Exterminating Company arose from a home construction project gone bad. When the plaintiffs occupied their new home, they discovered termite infestations. The general contractor referred the matter to its insurer, which hired the defendant.   Plaintiffs entered into a contract with defendant to treat the termite problem. Unfortunately, it didn’t work; in the end, the defendants treated the house eighteen times in eighteen years. Finally, the plaintiffs sued Orkin for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and fraud. The trial court entered partial summary judgment, finding that defendant owed plaintiff no fiduciary duty, and that the economic loss rule barred plaintiffs’ tort claims.

The central issue on appeal in Cook was whether the economic loss rule is applicable to service contracts. The court concluded that the underlying policy of upholding the parties’ reasonable expectations, rooted in the contract, necessarily meant that the economic loss rule barred all of plaintiffs’ tort claims.

Although a number of states have not yet taken the same step, the Court of Appeal’s decision is certainly correct. Some have argued that the rule is solely intended to maintain the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code as an exclusive remedy where the Code applies, meaning that the rule should be limited to products liability. Nevertheless, many states have extended the economic loss rule to tort claims arising out of construction contracts. Given that construction contracts are to a considerable degree service contracts, both settled law and the policy underlying the economic loss rule should make the rule applicable to service contracts.

A quarter century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that if the trend towards introducing tort into everyday business disputes continued unabated, "contract law would drown in a sea of tort." The Arizona Court of Appeals has taken an important step towards redeeming the Supreme Court’s long-ago promise.

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