The Illinois Supreme Court has published its docket book for the March term, and the Court’s docket call will be heavy on civil matters this month in Springfield. 

On March 10, the Court will hear argument in Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz, which involves the entitlement exclusion in personal automobile insurance policies, and Speed District 802 v. Warning, which involves an unfair labor practices charge arising out of the termination of a teacher’s contract.  The next day, the Court hears Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, which presents issues of the scope of evidence relevant to an insurer’s duty to defend, Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, which relates a common carrier’s potential duty to clear away natural accumulations of snow and ice, and Clerk v. The Children’s Memorial Hospital, which involves the scope of Illinois’ cause of action for wrongful birth.

On March 16, the Court will hear argument in Baumgartner v. Baumgartner.  There, the principal issue is whether incarceration is an act of self-emancipation terminating the support obligation in a divorce decree.  The Court will also hear K. Miller Construction Co. v. McGinnis, which involves the construction of the Home Repair and Remodeling Act.  Finally, on March 17, the Court hears Cwik v. Giannoulias, a putative class action alleging that the state’s practice of not paying over interest or income earned by reclaimed property while in the state’s custody is an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation.

Decisions in each of these cases should come later in the year.

[UPDATED THROUGH September 12, 2016]

In re M.I.

Supreme Court Case Number: 120232

Appellate Court: Third District

Appellate Court Case Number: 3-15-0403

Issue Presented: Is it grounds for termination of parental rights based upon the parent’s failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child and failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility where the undisputed evidence was that the parent allegedly had an extremely low I.Q. and the State failed to provide a service plan for him?

Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings: Following the filing of a petition for wardship in 2010, the trial court found the child to be a neglected minor and made her a ward of the court. The trial court required the child’s father to cooperate with the Department of Children and Family Services, complete a drug and alcohol assessment, participate in drug tests and take a parenting class. An integrated assessment in November 2013 concluded that the father lacked the ability to parent. The State filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in May 2014. The trial court concluded that services could not be modified for the father given his unwillingness to consistently show up for appointments, and that he had not made reasonable progress over a nine-month period. A termination order was entered. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that failure to complete tasks which are apparently beyond a parent’s intellectual capacity is the same was willfully failing to comply, and noted that the State had not alleged the father’s intellectual incapacity as grounds for the termination. The Appellate Court majority wrote that the State had “abandoned a parent . . . to navigate the community social services network on his own and used his inability to do so as a grounds to terminate his parental rights.” Justice Schmidt dissented.

Appellate Court opinion

In re Marriage of Tuke (Heroy)

Supreme Court Case Number: 120205

Appellate Court: First District, Division One

Appellate Court Case Number: 1-13-0290-U

Issues Presented: (1) Did the former husband in a domestic relations case meet his burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of an earlier permanent maintenance award? (2) May one former spouse be ordered to contribute towards the attorneys fees of the other based upno a showing solely of his superior financial position, as opposed to evidence of the other former spouse’s inability to pay?

Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings: An initial judgment of dissolution of the parties’ marriage was entered by the circuit court in 2006, together with an award of permanent maintenance. In 2009, the former husband filed a modification petition seeking termination or modification of the former wife’s permanent maintenance award. In 2012, the trial court issued its judgment establishing a modified permanent maintenance award. The court also directed the former husband to contribute towards the former wife’s attorney fees. The former husband moved for reconsideration, but the trial court “essentially reiterated its original order.” On appeal, the Appellate Court rejected the former husband’s argument that the trial court should have further reduced or entirely eliminated the maintenance award pursuant to the statutory requirement to consider the former wife’s efforts to become financially self-supporting, holding that the trial court’s finding that her efforts were reasonable was not an abuse of discretion. The Appellate Court held that the trial court had made a calculation error, noting that the court had commented that it wanted to enter a modified order providing for permanent maintenance of 25% of the former husband’s cash flow. Finally, the Court reversed the order to the extent it required the former husband to contribute to the former wife’s attorneys’ fees, holding that the proper standard was whether one party had proven an inability to pay, not whether the other party had superior resources.

Appellate Court opinion

[UPDATED THROUGH June 13, 2015]

Henderson Square Condominium Ass’n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC

Supreme Court Case Number: 118139

Appellate Court: First Appellate District, Division Five

Appellate Court Case Number: 1-13-0764

Issues Presented: (1) Did plaintiffs adequately allege facts sufficient to invoke the fraud exception to the statute of limitations in suit against condominium developer in relation to defects discovered in the construction? (2) Did plaintiffs adequately plead causes of action with respect to defendants’ alleged failure to provide adequate reserve funds for necessary repairs?

Summary of Facts and lower court opinions (Appellate Court opinion attached)

[UPDATED THROUGH September 12, 2016]

Moon v. Rhode

Supreme Court Case Number: 119572

Appellate Court: Third District

Appellate Court Case Number:3-13-0613

Issue Presented: Does the discovery rule apply to the statute of limitations for wrongful death claims?

Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings

Report on the Oral Argument

Murphy-Hylton v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc.

Supreme Court Case Number: 120394

Appellate Court: First District, First Division

Appellate Court Case Number: 1-14-2804

Issue Presented: Does the partial immunity from negligence liability found in the Snow and Ice Removal Act apply to ice allegedly caused by purportedly negligent landscaping or maintenance?

Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings

Wardwell v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.

Supreme Court Case Number: 120438

Appellate Court: Fifth District

Appellate Court Case Number: 5-14-0461

Issue Presented: In an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, is evidence that a nonrailroad third party may have been the sole cause of injuries sustained by the plaintiff rendered inadmissible if the plaintiff produces some evidence by which the jury could permissibly conclude that the railroad was, to some degree, negligent?

Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings: Plaintiff sustained a severe back injury in a two-car collision while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by an agent/employee of his railroad employer. The vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by a nonrailroad third party. It was stipulated that the driver of that second vehicle was intoxicated at the time of the accident and had either blacked out or fallen asleep. The trial court denied motions in limine filed by plaintiff seeking to preclude evidence that the third party was the sole cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Court noted that a railroad employer is 100% liable for an employee’s injuries whenever the employer is to any degree negligent. The Court noted that plaintiff presented evidence that the driver of the vehicle he was in failed to comply with her driver training prior to switching lanes. According to the majority, once the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence by which the jury could find that the defendant employer was negligent, the possible negligence of third parties was rendered irrelevant and inadmissible. Justice Moore dissented. He noted that there was some evidence in the record that the plaintiff’s driver’s lane change had happened as much as twenty seconds before the crash. If the jury chose to believe such evidence, then the defendant employer was not in any degree responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, and the jury was free to find that the nonrailroad third party was the sole cause of those injuries.

Appellate Court Opinion

Carney v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

Supreme Court Case Number: 118984

Appellate Court: First District, Division Four

Appellate Court Case Number: 1-13-0105

Issue Presented: Was there a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in an action for injuries sustained in a bridge removal regarding whether the railroad retained sufficient control over part of the work and whether it should have known of a dangerous condition on the premises and failed to warn the contractor?

Summary of Facts and Lower Court Holdings:Defendant agreed with a contractor to demolish and remove certain unused bridges. The agreement provided that all work to be performed by the contractor was to be completed to the railroad’s satisfaction and the acceptance of a railroad representative. The railroad retained the right to stop the work or make changes in the work, and to terminate the contract immediately if the contractor’s services were unsatisfactory. The contractor enlisted the assistance of a bridge demolition company as sub-contractor for the removal. The contractor had allegedly never removed a similar plate girder bridge. While the bridge was being removed, a beam snapped, and the western girder fell towards the east, severely injuring the plaintiff. The plaintiff resolved his claims against the subcontractor and contractor, but proceeded against the railroad. The railroad moved for summary judgment; the trial court initially denied the motion, but then granted reconsideration and granted summary judgment. The plaintiff then moved for reconsideration and the trial court reversed itself again. The railroad sought a supervisory order from the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court directed the court to vacate its most recent order and reinstate summary judgment for the railroad. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Court held that whether or not the defendant owed a duty to plaintiff depended on to what degree it controlled the work. The Court noted that the defendant retained the right to terminate the agreement, remove any employee or equipment, or makes changes in the dimensions of the job. Under the circumstances, there was a material issue of fact as to whether the defendant had sufficient control to create a duty. The Court further held that there was a material dispute of fact as to whether the defendant might be liable for negligent selection in connection with the contractor, given the contractor’s admission that it had never removed that kind of bridge before. Finally, the Court held that there was a material dispute of fact as to whether the defendant could be liable to plaintiff as a the owner of the land, given that there was some evidence that the fact that the floor plates extended well beyond the end of the bridge contributed to plaintiff’s injuries.

Appellate Court Opinion